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The Jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights Should Outlive
Defection
Humberto Briceno Leon*
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction
should outlive the purpose of any state to denounce the
American Convention on Human Rights in order to avoid
disadvantageous international rules and circumvent the international adjudicative authority to protect victims of human rights violations. I begin by outlining the Human Rights
jus cogens nature integrated into the universal international
human rights law. Following that, I review leading international court cases approaching the jurisdictional paradigm
on treaty defections. Furthermore, I propose two conjunctive
new elements modifying the mechanical jurisdictional paradigm: the constitutional internationalized human rights
treaties and the substantial reviewability of a treaty’s defection. I conclude by examining the interface concerning the
American Convention on Human Rights and Latin American
constitutions. In approaching the Latin American constitutions, I will demonstrate how what I refer to as the “jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model” would operate.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“You can check out any time you like
But you can never leave”1
“Hotel California” – Eagles
In 1803, United States Chief Justice John Marshall observed that
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.” 2 According to the indisputable universal standard of ubi jus ibi remedium, for every wrong, the law must provide
a remedy for the wrong.3 This is most notable in international human
rights law.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction should
outlive the purpose of any state who denounces the American
1

EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Criteria Studios 1977).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
3
See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
2
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Convention on Human Rights (AMCHR) in order to avoid disadvantageous international rules and circumvent the international adjudicative authority to protect victims of human rights violations. I
begin by outlining the human rights jus cogens integrated into universal international human rights law. Following that, I review the
leading international court cases approaching the jurisdictional paradigm on treaty defections. Furthermore, I propose two conjunctive
new elements that modify the mechanical jurisdictional paradigm:
(1) constitutional internationalized human rights treaties and (2)
substantial reviewability of a treaty’s defection. I conclude by examining the interface concerning the AMCHR and Latin American
constitutions. In examining the Latin American constitutions, I will
demonstrate how what I refer to as the “jus cogens complementary
jurisdictional model” would operate.
Given the principle of subsidiarity in the international human
rights forum, human rights should be safeguarded by special international bodies when the national or domestic systems are unwilling
or unable to do so efficiently. 4 No human rights protection, domestic nor international from the Inter-American court, would be available when the following conditions persist: domestic absence of a
trustworthy judiciary, denunciation of the AMCHR, mechanical interpretation of the international treaties’ disengagement rules, and
the lapsation of the post-withdrawal temporal jurisdiction remaining.
Any state—whether a perpetrator of human rights violations in
Latin America or elsewhere—would yield an immunity prerogative
of sorts.5 The victims of those transgressions would be defenseless
and unable to secure redress.6 Under these circumstances, a rigid
conventional or contractual international human rights law perspective would surrender regional human rights values that were poorly
constructed after the Second World War.
4

See Humberto Briceño León, The International Criminal Court: Interconnection Between International Bodies in Venezuela, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
261, 296 (2020).
5
See generally Rosanne van Alebeek, Immunity and Human Rights? A Bifurcated Approach, 104 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING (AMERICAN SOC’Y OF INT’L
L.) 67, 67 (2010).
6
See Zia Akthar, Acts of State, State Immunity, and Judicial Review in the
United States, 7 BRIT. J. OF AM. LEGAL STUD. 206, 206 (2018).
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II.
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE JUS COGENS CHARACTER
Over the past half-century, the universalization of human rights
has become a clear phenomenon.7 Contemporarily, prominent
scholars have highlighted this phenomenon’s effect over international law, especially regarding the very classic Westphalian model
of sovereignty. Indeed, Professor Dworkin has observed that “[a]
government is illegitimate if it violates the basic human rights of its
citizens . . . [and] fails in its duties when it uses the shield of sovereignty to decline to protect people in other nations from war crimes,
genocide, and other violations of human rights.”8
The sovereignty-based arguments against the applicability of internationally protected human rights are no longer effective. This is
the result of an enormous compendium of treaties, customary state
practices, and legally binding international law that have characterized the aggregation of treaties, customs, national legislation, and
jus cogens.9
In international law, jus dispositivum and jus cogens are notions
related to the power of states to conclude international treaties.10
Some treaties could be left without constraints and thus having the
character of the jus dispositivum. Conversely, others have the nature
of jus cogens from which no abrogation is permitted.11 In Article 53,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) codified the conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law (i.e., jus cogens). 12
7

See André Luiz Siciliano, The Role of the Universalization of Human
Rights and Migration in the Formation of a New Global Governance, 9 SUR INT’L
J. ON HUM. RTS. 109, 109–10 (2012).
8
GENERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (Siegfried Wiessner ed.,
2017) (citing Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 2, 17-18 (2013)).
9
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 238 (1993).
10
Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law, KLUWER L. INT’L, 595, 595 (2003).
11
Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law,
60 AM. J. INT’L L. 55, 55 (1966).
12
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969–Apr. 30,
1970, 1155 U.N.T.S. 344 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
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The international regulations governing jus cogens are all rules
created for humanitarian purposes— not in the interest of individual
states, but in the interest of humanity.13 Members of the United Nations have the obligation to respect fundamental freedoms.14 Since
1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations has been dictating resolutions defending and promoting human rights.15 In 2001,
the “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts” were submitted to the General Assembly. Article
26 declared “[n]othing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of
any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.”16 More
recently, in March 15, 2006, the General Assembly stated that it is
the responsibility of all states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms “without distinction of any kind as to race, color,
sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.”17 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) also decided that states are required to uphold their obligations
under the United Nations Charter along with other rules of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights
laws.18
In 1987, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
adopted the concept of jus cogens “from ancient law concepts of a
‘superior order’ of legal norms, which the laws of man or nations
may not contravene. The jus cogens norms have been described as
‘comprising “international public policy.”’”19 The Inter-American
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”).
13
Verdross, supra note 11, at 59.
14
See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, U.N.,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-internationalhuman-rights-law/index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).
15
See G.A. Res. 1 (I) (Jan. 24, 1946).
16
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 84, U.N. Doc. A/56/10.
17
G.A. Res. 60/251 A, at 1 (Mar. 15, 2006).
18
Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 53, ¶ 127 (Feb. 3).
19
Roach v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶ 55 (1987).
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Court’s first reference to jus cogens was in 1993, when it referred to
the prohibition of slavery as a norm of jus cogens.20 Indeed, it asserted “[t]he Court does not deem it necessary to investigate whether
or not that agreement is an international treaty. Suffice it to say that
even if that were the case, the treaty would today be null and void
because it contradicts the norms of jus cogens supervenience.”21
Later, in 2003, the Inter-American Court decided that, “[t]he absolute prohibition of torture, in all its forms, is now part of international jus cogens.”22 Subsequently, in 2005, the court again confirmed that
[t]he above mentioned international instruments and
its own case law lead the Court to conclude that there
is a universal prohibition of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, independent of any codification or declaration, since
all these practices constitute a violation of peremptory norms of international law.23
The Inter-American Court has found different norms that constitute as jus cogens, such as rules against slavery, torture, any cruel
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, discrimination,
grave or systematic violations of human rights, and humanitarian
law.24 The court also found the prohibition against genocide, crimes
against humanity, forced disappearance, the right to life, and the
right to be seen as equal before the law as jus cogens.25
According to Professor Andrea Bianchi of Johns Hopkins University, the Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Geneva, and the Catholic University, Milan, today, the notion of jus cogens is at the heart of the international human rights
20
Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 15, ¶ 57 (Sept. 10, 1993).
21
Id.
22
Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, ¶ 92 (Nov. 27, 2003).
23
Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 70 (Mar. 11, 2005).
24
DIANA CONTRERAS-GARDUÑO & IGNACIO ALVAREZ RIO, THE
REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: WHEN THEORY MEETS PRACTICE: STUDIES IN
HONOUR OF LEO ZWAAK 113-124 (Yves Haeck et al. eds., 2013).
25
Id. at 122.
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legal system.26 Far from the traditional conception, jus cogens grants
priority to certain rules over others, whereby human rights, treaties,
and customary law should prevail over other sources of international
and domestic law.27 As Professor Anthony Colangelo of the Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law has observed,
“[s]tate[] Parties have created through their entrance into the treaty
a customary international legal prohibition that extends into the territories of all States, irrespective of their status under the positive
law of the treaty.”28
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND JURISDICTIONAL
PARADIGM: THE LEGITIMATE DEFECTION, A NEW
COMPONENT
The following are relevant international cases in which jus cogens norms could serve as grounds for the ICJ’s jurisdiction. The
leading case before the ICJ was Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Rwanda in 2006.29 On May 28, 2002, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) filed a proceeding before the ICJ against the Republic of Rwanda (“Rwanda”) concerning
flagrant violations and breaches of human rights and international
humanitarian law.30 By killing, massacring, raping, throat-cutting,
and crucifying more than 3.5 million Congolese, the DRC asked the
ICJ, among other requests, to declare that Rwanda had violated the
right to life provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and other relevant international legal instruments.31
The ICJ’s original jurisdiction concerning peremptory norms
has been set forth in articles 66 (a), 64, and 53 of the Vienna
26

Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 491, 494 (2008).
27
Id. at 494-95.
28
Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False
Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 913 (2009).
29
Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
30
Id. at 11-12, ¶1.
31
Id. at 15, ¶ 11(d).
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Convention.32 Textually, this jurisdiction stands for inter-party controversies to the extent that it involves a new peremptory norm in
conflict with any existing treaty or concerns a treaty which at the
time of its conclusion is in contradiction with peremptory norms.33
The DRC did not allege any of these circumstances directly to reach
the ICJ jurisdiction in the Congo case.34
In this case, the DRC alleged numerous international conventions that grant the ICJ jurisdiction to apply and interpret the international treaty at issue.35 The DRC purported that several international conventions provided the ICJ with additional jurisdictions bases in the event that the Vienna Convention did not grant the original
jurisdiction; however, those grounds did not convince the court.36
The ICJ decided the governmental withdrawal reservation is invalid
not because of the withdrawal purpose, but because (1) the breach
of procedural rules and Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; (2) Rwanda’s reservation to Article 22 of the Convention
on Racial Discrimination concerning non-compliance with a peremptory norm cannot constitute a basis to find the court’s jurisdiction;
(3) the court cannot assume jurisdiction on the basis of Article 29 of
the Convention on Discrimination against Women on the ground
that the preconditions required by that provision for a referral to the
Court have not been fulfilled; and (4) Rwanda was not a party to the
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
32

Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 66 (“Any one of the parties to a
dispute concerning the application or the interpretation of article 53 or 64 may, by
a written application, submit it to the International Court of Justice for a decision
unless the parties by common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration”);
id. at art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges,
any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates”); id. at art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”).
33
See id.
34
See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at. 6-10.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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Treatment or Punishment (Article 30.1) and thus the DRC cannot
invoke that instrument as a basis of jurisdiction.37 The ICJ also denied arguments based on nonexclusive human rights conventions
that the DRC alleged for the ICJ’s jurisdiction, for example, on the
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Article XIV), which did not apply because the
DRC failed to fulfill the prior procedure for ceasing the court’s jurisdiction.38 The court could also not establish jurisdiction because
of the noncompliance preconditions established by the Constitution
of the World Health Organization (Article 75).39 On the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (Article IX), the DRC also failed to fulfill the conditions required concerning the recourse to arbitration.40 Finally, DRC’s argument about
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Article 14.1) did not appear to establish
jurisdiction.41
Regarding its jurisdiction in this case, the ICJ asserted that
the Court deems it necessary to recall that the mere
fact that rights and obligations erga omnes or peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself constitute an exception to the principle that its jurisdiction
always depends on the consent of the parties.42
In this case, the ICJ, under its own authority, held that the states
should fulfill their jus cogens human rights obligations but also decided to exclude human rights peremptory norms “in itself” as a basis for its jurisdiction.43 This international judicial decision raised an
ostensible conflict: the state’s obligations and responsibilities were
judicially affirmed, but without jurisdiction to address it.44 This ICJ
ruling has been criticized, as Proffessor Andrea Bianchi has
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 21-53.
Id.
Id.
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 21-53.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 52 ¶ 125.
Id. at 52-53.
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observed, “[t]he inderogability paradigm and its mechanical application may bring about anti-systemic effects and eventually jeopardize even the role that jus cogens may play in its symbolic dimension.”45
The academic forum has found the ICJ’s doctrine contradictory,
as it, on the one hand, employs the traditional jurisdictional paradigm grounded exclusively in the parties’ agreement regardless of
jus cogens and, on the other, diverts violations of peremptory norms.
46
In its purest form, the peremptory model is expressed in nonderogable legal forms, postulating jus cogens pre-eminence and values.47 Scholars have called for a more flexible interpretation, proposing a higher degree of effectiveness and coherence.48
The ICJ held that jus cogens could not be the basis for the court’s
jurisdiction.49 Obviously, the court was very aware of what it was
doing.50 In doing so, the court used the same idea of jus cogens
various times, claiming that it “does not in itself suffice to confer
jurisdiction on the Court,” 51 “cannot of itself provide a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court,” “the mere fact that rights and obligations
erga omnes,” and that it “cannot in itself constitute an exception to
the principle that its jurisdiction always depends on the consent of
the parties.”52 The textual persistence of all those ideas, “in itself”
“the mere fact”, from the ICJ approach to its lack of jurisdiction
based on the sole notion of jus cogens, strongly suggests a court’s
potential receptiveness for jus cogens’ additional components in order to find jurisdiction.53
An English dictionary defines the words “in itself” as, “[v]iewed
in its essential qualities; considered separately from other things.”54
From there, those phrases suggest a question: what did the court
45

Bianchi, supra note 26, at 503-04.
See Contreras-Garduño & Alvarez Rio, supra note 24, at 119.
47
See Bianchi, supra note 26, at 505.
48
Id.
49
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 52, ¶ 125.
50
See id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 28, ¶ 60
53
See id.
54
UK Dictionary, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/itself (last visited May 11, 2020) (defining “itself”‘ as “viewed in its essential qualities; considered separately from other things.”).
46
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attempt to signify by persistently using the phrase “in itself”? I propose an alternative reading to the court’s traditional doctrine on the
jurisdiction—jus cogens connection or disconnection. The ICJ left
open a window when it said that the jus cogens character “in itself”
did not suffice to confer its jurisdiction.55 Consequently, jus cogens
together with the right component could provide the basis for the
court’s jurisdiction. I refer to this alternative understanding the “jus
cogens complementary jurisdictional model.”
In this article, I explore the far off-centered notions surrounding
the use of the rigid jurisdictional paradigm when it is stated that jus
cogens “in itself” does not serve to establish jurisdiction.56 The new
model takes this notion and integrates it into the traditional jurisdictional paradigm. As a result, my model incorporates two closely related, conjunctive elements: first, the acknowledgement of jus cogens as constitutionally internationalized in the human rights contained in the AMCHR; and second, a substantive reviewability of a
treaty’s defection. I consider both elements conjunctively because a
disjunctive approach would not operate under the plain mechanical
jurisdictional paradigm. The first element was dismissed disjunctively in the case because jus cogens in itself is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.57 The ICJ has disjunctively applied the second element, but only on the grounds of its incompatibility with procedural formalities as required by international treaty law.58 The traditional jurisdiction paradigm has not directly considered the reviewability of the abrogation of substantive purposes as grounds to
invalidate a treaty defection.59
According to the monist view, international and domestic laws
are part of the same legal order, but international law prevails over
domestic law.60 Following Professor Bradley, from the dualist perspective, international and domestic laws are distinct, and domestic
law defines the rank of international law within in the domestic

55

See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 52.
See id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 25.
59
See id. at 29.
60
Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999).
56
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system.61 Concerning the proposed model, the monist and dualist
doctrines would reach the same practical consequence. Indeed, both
perspectives would grant the Inter-American Court authority over
any given party of the AMCHR: under the dualistic view, because
the international jurisdiction would come from the domestic law
adoption of the AMCHR prevalence, and under the monist view because of the plain international law pre-eminence.62
Once all other conditions required by international law are fulfilled, which other possible factors could establish jurisdiction on
the court? Applying the mechanical jurisdictional paradigm to human rights treaties exclusively would make a denunciation almost
always be a valid form to defect it regardless of its purposes.63
Under the traditional jurisdictional model, a denunciation purpose could be to join a more advanced court in conflict with the one
in charge or to join a more progressive international human rights
treaty. This treaty defection could be endorsed as a result of compliance of the procedural requirements of the national law and the correlative standards of international law. In this case, the treaty’s withdrawal would be valid because of the procedural rules, not because
of its good purposes. Now, the same inflexible traditional jurisdictional paradigm has an inverse component: a counter-jus cogens defection to a human rights treaty pursuing to avoid sanctions and circumvent peremptory obligations. In the latest case, the denunciation
would also be valid, regardless of the intrinsic regrettable purpose
involved.
In the example, the governmental act issuing the counter-jus cogens defection would be heard before an international court. Indeed,
the ICJ reviewed the Congo case under the procedural international
law standards stemming from Rwanda’s withdrawal of its prior reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention.64 The court
found the governmental withdrawal reservation invalid because of
the breach of procedural rules,65 not because of the alleged purpose.

61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id.
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. at 13.
Id. at 29.

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

13

As a result, the court retained the effects of Rwanda’s original reservation to the ICJ jurisdiction, therefore its lack of jurisdiction.66
As the “jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model” submits, the international court would keep competence to review the
governmental defections acts as the traditional jurisdiction paradigm
does. To review the defections of an international human rights
treaty, the new model adds the counter-jus cogens component as a
new cause of invalidation.67 In this model, the “mere”68 existence of
peremptory norms is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction when
there is a legitimate reason to leave a human rights treaty. Admitted
as illegitimate, the counter-jus cogens component as grounds to invalidate the defection, the protection for the peremptory human
rights survives.69
Displaying its potential openness to the new “jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model” in the same Congo case, the ICJ
took modest steps toward the counter-jus cogens factor. Indeed, the
decision affirmed that the DRC made no objection to the Rwanda
reservation of the Genocide Convention.70 The court, however, suggested a possible illegal reservation under the grounds of its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention.71 In fact,
according to the conventional rules, the court stated “in the view of
the Court, a reservation under the Genocide Convention would be
permissible to the extent that such reservation is not incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention.”72
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY INTERNATIONALIZED JUS COGENS
AS A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR
On February 1988, a meeting convened by the Commonwealth
Secretariat and chaired by Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati,
Chief Justice of India took place.73 In that meeting, the participating
IV.

66

Id.
See id. at 50.
68
Id. at 52 (the word “mere” was used by the I.C.J in the Congo case).
69
Id. at 8.
70
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J at 33.
71
Id. at 7.
72
Id. at 32.
73
Michael Kirby, International Law-The Impact on National Constitutions,
21 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 327, 334-335 (2006).
67
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judges accepted the so-called Bangalore Principles on the Domestic
Application of International Human Rights Norms.74 Since then, the
Bangalore Principles have played a significant role in the adoption
or incorporation of the international human rights law into domestic
law, including national constitutions.75 International law has enhanced constitutionalism and international human rights laws, creating a globalized phenomenon.76 As a result, international instruments and national practices might influence each other and could
thus be seen as a model of constitutional convergence.77 Both elements show a general principle in international law as well as an
interactive relationship between constitutionalism and internationalism.78
A. The Inter-American Court, the Interface: ConstitutionsInternational Human Rights Treaties
Since international law provides rules of rights enforcement for
the national constitution, the reverse tends to happen as well; some
domestic constitutions incorporate more precise rules.79 The interrelation between international treaties and constitutions is a two-way
path. The first path is represented by the international treaties’ significance over the national laws included in the constitutions.80 The
international human rights incorporation into constitutions is a process that has been exhaustively studied by the legal academy. 81 The
second path is the reverse: the constitutions’ legal significance into
the international human rights system. Indeed, the internationalized
constitution is influenced to confer jurisdiction on the international
court, as I suggest.82

74

Id.
Id. at 340.
76
Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights,
19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 766 (2008).
77
Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 61, 65 (2013).
78
See Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 239.
79
See Ginsburg et al., supra note 77, at 83.
80
Id. at 84.
81
See id. at 88.
82
Id. at 65.
75

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

15

Today, the human rights system itself can appropriately be categorized as a constitutionalized regime of international law and has
“become one of constitutional law in its own right.”83 Then, there
is a universal crystallization of human rights laws into the constitutions, known as internationalized constitutions.84 Some rights, for
example the freedom of expression and freedom of religion, appear
in almost nine of every ten contemporary constitutions.85
Some contemporary constitutions tend to rank international human rights treaties over the ordinary norms and, in some cases,
“equivalent to or even above constitutional norms . . . .”86 As a result, in Latin America, internationalized constitutions have taken a
progressive role since the second half of the last century.87 The supra-constitutional or constitutional hierarchy given to the human
rights treaties began in the region in 1979, with the Peruvian Constitution, followed by the constitutions of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Venezuela. 88 Also, the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica stated
that the AMCHR is ranked above the Constitution,89 as it also is in
Switzerland, “where the peremptory norms of jus cogens, but not
83
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See generally Gonzalo Aguiar Caballo, La internacionalizacion del
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CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 223 (2007) (Spain).
85
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Neil Walker, Sovereignty and Beyond: The Double Edge of External Constitutionalism, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 799, 815 (2018).
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See generally Gabriel Negretto & Javier Couso, Constitution-Building
Processes in Latin America, INT’L IDEA DISCUSSION PAPER (2018) 6, 10-11,
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/constitution-building-processes-in-latin-america.pdf.
88
Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Interpretación Conforme y Control Difuso de
Convencionalidad. El Nuevo Paradigma para el Juez Mexicano, Año 9, Nº 2,
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE CHILE UNIVERSIDAD DE TALCA,
531, 547 (2011); see also Carlos M. Ayala Corao, La Jerarquia Constitucional de
los Tratados Relativos a los Derechos Humanos y sus Consecuencias, INSTITUTO
DE INVESTIGACIONES JURIDICIAS, 37,44 (2002), https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/1/342/4.pdf.
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the other rules of customary international law, are superior to the
Constitution.”90
In Latin America, the AMCHR and the constitutional concordat
guarantees opened up the domestic legal order to international human rights law. The Inter-American jurisprudence shows that states
have repealed and amended laws, including their own constitutions
as “[t]here is little doubt that this system constitutes the normative
core of the Ius Commune.”91
The current interrelation between international treaties law and
constitutions has prompted international courts to consider the significance and legal weight that constitutions could have over the international human rights system.92
In the concurring opinion in Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, according to Inter-American Court judge, A.A. Cançado, European
and Inter-American courts have agreed on limits to state voluntarism
to safeguard the integrity of the human rights treaties and the primacy of public order over the will of individual States.93 In Caesar,
the court expressly dismissed the national constitution as a shield
against the AMCHR.94 Indeed, the court stated that
[I]nasmuch as it immunizes the Corporal Punishment
Act from a challenge, the ‘savings clause’ under Section 6 of Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution is incompatible with the Convention. Therefore, the court
orders the State to amend, within a reasonable time,
Section 6 of Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution . . . .95
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Thus, the three internal state acts that were upheld by the InterAmerican Court to be incompatible with the AMCHR include the
punishment inflicted over the claimant, the Corporal Punishment
Act, and Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution clause.96
In Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile, the Inter-American court went further and found four state acts that were incompatible with the
AMCHR. 97 These acts included an adjudicative act that censored
the film “The Last Temptation of Christ,” an executive decree law
that authorized the Cinematographic Classification Council for censorship purposes, the Chilean Supreme Court decision that confirmed the censorship, and Article 19(2) of the Chilean Constitution
that allowed the censorship.98 The four state acts coincidently
allowed the censorship, the adjudicative act, the decree-law, the Supreme Court decision, and the Constitutional clause.99 The InterAmerican court then established authority to review the constitutional clauses, other normative acts, supreme court decisions, and governmental adjudications.100
As a matter of consistency, if the Inter-American court has the
authority to dismiss a constitutional clause incompatible with the
AMCHR, the court has the same authority to enforce a constitutional
rule fully compatible with the AMCHR.101 If a constitutional rule
fully consistent with the AMCHR constrains the governmental
authority to denounce the AMCHR as illegitimate, a substantive breach of internationalized constitutional limitation should be equally
invalidated.102
As a highly persuasive authority in International Law, the ICJ in
Guinea has affirmed this power, claiming that “where a State puts
forward a manifestly incorrect interpretation of its domestic law,
particularly for the purpose of gaining an advantage in a pending
case, it is for the Court to adopt the proper interpretation.”103
96
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B. Constitutional Weight on the International Treaty. Latin
American Constitution: An Illegitimate Defection.
The jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model is not applicable to every international treaty. For the model to operate, it requires the involvement of jus cogens, similar to the Vienna Convention.104 It entails that the living constitutional-international human
rights interface acknowledge the peremptory character of the
treaty.105
As discussed above, the ICJ’s holding in the Congo case allows
an unostentatious window to its rigid jurisdictional paradigm.106 Additionally, the same ICJ court in Guinea v. Congo stated that a manifestly incorrect interpretation of domestic law is for an international court to adopt the proper interpretation.107 In Guinea, the court
emphasized a particular circumstance in which the International
Court should correct the local understanding. This circumstance arises it is when the manifestly incorrect interpretation has the purpose
of gaining an advantage in a pending case.108 On this question, the
Guinea case seems to offer a more flexible reading of the traditional
jurisdiction paradigm than that asserted in the Congo case. 109
The Costa Rican, Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan constitutional systems have ranked the normative authority of the
AMCHR above the constitutional rules.110 Then, hypothetically, if
a national interpretation from any of these countries wrongly affirms
the constitutional consistency of the AMCHR’s denunciation, it is
up to the Inter-American court’s jurisdictional power to correct it.111
Otherwise, if the court follows the mechanical application of the jurisdictional-paradigm, it would just be focused on the plain consent
of the parties.112 I deeply share Professor Andrea Bianchi’s hope: “It
is to be hoped that the focus will be shifted from the mechanical
104
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paradigm of inderogability to the more flexible level of interpretation to ensure that jus cogens can be implemented at the contextual
level with a higher degree of effectiveness and coherence.” 113
In 1999, Peru attempted to withdraw its jurisdiction from the Inter-American court. The court held that the only acceptable method
to accomplish such a withdrawal was to completely denounce the
AMCHR.114 The court partially acknowledged the ICJ’s traditional
jurisdictional paradigm on the denunciation issue, but also gave a
step forward to review the denunciation legitimacy by asserting its
invalidity.115
In my alternative reading of the ICJ’s jurisdictional-paradigm in
the Congo case, the AMCHR’s denunciation would be legitimate if
the Inter-American Court could not find a purpose to avoid the convention’s substantive obligation, or avoid the disadvantageous international rules circumventing the international adjudicative authority
to protect victims of human rights violations that are not for purposes of gaining advantages in a pending case.116 Otherwise, the denunciation would be ineffective and the Inter-American Court
would maintain its jurisdiction.117 To invalidate a biased denunciation grounded in the alternative model, the court would have to assert its authority to enforce the effectiveness of the AMCHR. On a
similar tendency, a commentator has noted that “[t]he arguments
against the legality of late reservations and strategic denunciation
are especially strong in the context of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] and ACHR [American Convention on
Human Rights].”118
On reviewing a denunciation of AMCHR, the Inter-American
Court provides at least three alternative models. One model requires
courts to follow mechanically and rigidly the traditional
113
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jurisdictional paradigm ignoring the jus cogens constitutionally internationalized character of the AMCHR as a source of the InterAmerican court Jurisdiction. Under this model, the court would sustain its jurisdiction exclusively on the parties’ consent.119 Another
approach is to acknowledge the peremptory nature of the AMCHR
constitutionally internationalized as a framework to review the denunciation substantive legitimacy. Under this model, the court
would check specifically if the defection is to avoid adverse international rules or to circumvent its international adjudicative authority, and if it is for the purpose of gaining an advantage in a pending
case.120 Finally, in view of the denunciation, exclusively based on
the inconsistency with the jus cogens character of the AMCHR as at
issue in a dispute, the court could directly ,without any further element, founding its jurisdiction exclusively on the peremptory character of the AMCHR.
A key element for this article’s purpose is the relatively new
constitutional phenomenon constraining the potential defection
from international human rights treaties, restricting the domestic authority conventionally agreed to in order to leave an international
human rights treaty. On reviewing the Venezuelan defection to the
AMCHR, the Inter-American Court could consider the second alternative, the “jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model.” Indeed, Venezuela removed itself from the AMCHR, and therefore
from the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction by denouncing it on
September 10, 2012.121 Venezuela also withdrew from the Organization of American States on April 27, 2017.122 Article 23 of Venezuela’s Constitution sets forth the supra-constitutional rank of the
international human rights treaties,123 thus superseding national
119
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laws.124 That constitution, in Article 339, also expressly mentions
the AMCHR.125 In addition, the right to claim human rights violations before an international body is set forth in the first paragraph
of Article 31 of the Venezuela Constitution.126 This self-executing
norm established a direct cause of action; in other words, it gives
any Venezuelan citizen the right to go before an international
body—a court or quasi-judicial agency—to seek relief127 This same
constitutional clause in its second paragraph defers only to the legislature to implement the domestic enforcement, not the international cause of action.128 Therefore, according to the Venezuela’s
current international public law, those decisions are enforceable locally but also internationally without any further implementation.129
Thus, the Venezuelan Constitution has incorporated the Inter124

CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
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American Court’s jurisdictional authority broadly into the Venezuelan international law system.
To invalidate the defection, in addition to the supra-constitutionalized rank of the human rights treaty, the proposed model would
require the review of the denunciation’s legitimacy. Indeed, in my
opinion, the Venezuelan denunciation was fully illegitimate. On August 5, 2008, the Inter-American Court ordered the Venezuelan government to reinstall Judges Ana Ruggeri, Perkins Rocha, and Juan
Apitz to the bench.130 On December 18, 2008, the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice held that the Inter-American Court’s decision was unenforceable and requested the National Executive to
submit the AMCHR denunciation.131 This judicial decision shows
an indisputable intrusion on the political executive power to justify
the non-compliance of the Inter-American Court’s decision.132 Before the AMCHR denunciation was submitted before Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, two other claims against violations on the free speech right were highly reported by the media.133
Subsequently, the Inter-American Court decided the first case on
January 28, 2009 134 and the second case under its residual temporary jurisdiction on June 22, 2015.135 Both cases were in favor of the
plaintiff, but the government completely disregarded the InterAmerican court’s decisions.136 The Venezuelan Supreme Court of
Justice nowadays totally ignores the Inter-American court judgments.137
130
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The Inter-American court should reinstall the AMCHR for Venezuela, invalidate its denouncement, and assert the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice’s denouncement approval as incompatible
with the constitutionally internationalized AMCHR.
To abrogate the AMCHR is to directly repeal not only the Venezuelan Constitutional textual mention of the AMCHR, but also the
supra-constitutional rank of the international human rights treaty together with the right to seek relief before the Inter-American court.
This type of contention against the AMCHR is unprecedented in the
region, as it intends to erase the human rights contained within the
AMCHR for the Venezuelan people.
V.
CONCLUSION
Certainly, the principle ubi jus ibi remedium did not refer to any
specific remedy, but a right to a remedy. The proposed “jus cogens
complementary jurisdictional model” is a hybrid among monist and
dualist international law perspectives. It intends to amplify the traditional and mechanical jurisdictional paradigm governing the international treaty law.
To dispute the prospective lack of protection, the proposed
model incorporates two conjunctive components to encompass human rights remedies. These new elements are the internationalized
constitutional safeguard of rights and the substantive reviewability
of the treaty denunciation legitimacy as potentially bias state action
to leave a treaty through a counter-jus cogens intention. The stateof-the-art international human rights law is propitious to advance.
Important reflections in the scholarly and the international courts’
jurisprudence indicate a possible success. Currently, Latin America
has developed a profound interface between constitutions and international human rights law toward Ius Constitutionale Commune, a
purpose to be progressively accomplished. In close relation to the
people’s concrete life, the undisputable normative interconnection
is inter-related to human dignity. While international human rights
law and constitutions tend to remain the same, interpretations of the
norms should change in harmony with the constant, but imperceptible changes in the social reality of daily life.

